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Abstract
The track record in paying for performance in educa-
tion is not good; nevertheless, emphasis on accountabil-
ity and performance has gained momentum in the last 
25 years. This emphasis includes systems of merit pay, 
career  ladders,  and  national  board  certification.  The 
general failures of these efforts have led some reformers 
to suggest that teacher pay be directly related to stu-
dent value-added performance. This suggestion remains 
controversial but is also the hottest topic in paying for 
performance in education. Although many similarities 
exist  between  education  and  health  care,  major  dif-
ferences  may  make  it  even  harder  to  install  pay-for- 
performance  systems  in  health  than  in  education.  If 
those systems are to be tried, experiments should begin 
in  a  bottom-up  fashion  at  the  unit  level,  rather  than 
being imposed systemwide.
Introduction
The track record in paying for performance in education 
is not good; nevertheless, the issue has gained momentum 
in the last 25 years. Although education and health care 
share several similarities — for example, both are profes-
sionally labor-intensive and have flatter hierarchies than 
other fields — their differences may make installing pay-
for-performance systems more difficult in health care than 
in education. Because of the amount of money spent on 
each of these fields and their role in society, however, even 
small changes that enhance performance and accountabil-
ity will yield considerable benefit.
In each field, system-level incentives should be distin-
guished  from  individual-level  incentives.  In  education, 
the system levels are the district or school, and the indi-
vidual levels are primarily teachers. In health care, the 
system levels would be units such as clinics or hospitals 
and departments within those units. The individual levels 
would be caregivers, including doctors, nurse practitioners, 
physician  assistants,  nurses,  and  aides.  Accountability 
and  incentive  systems  at  the  system  level  would  differ 
from those at the individual level.
This  article  summarizes  accountability,  performance 
metrics, and reward systems in education for possible use 
in  health  care.  First,  I  describe  advances  in  education, 
emphasizing changes in accountability and achievement 
measures. Second, I review salary systems and individual- 
and  system-level  incentive  and  accountability  efforts  in 
education. Finally, I discuss the implications for health 
care of these efforts in education.
Changing Emphasis on Student 
Achievement and Institutional Performance
The modern era in accountability in American educa-
tion approximately dates from the publication of A Nation 
at Risk (1) in 1983. That national report was a scathing 
attack on the quality and competitiveness of American 
schools. Before that time, emphasis on student achieve-
ment  or  achievement-based  accountability  was  lacking. 
Instead, emphasis was on education inputs and equity in 
resources.
The opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the US Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or the authors’ affiliated institutions. Use of trade names is for identification only and 
does not imply endorsement by any of the groups named above.
  www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2010/sep/10_0046.htm • Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  1
John F. Witte, PhDVOLUME 7: NO. 5
SEPTEMBER 2010
2  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention • www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2010/sep/10_0046.htm
The opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the US Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or the authors’ affiliated institutions. Use of trade names is for identification only and 
does not imply endorsement by any of the groups named above.
That  emphasis  began  to  change,  first  through  state 
actions, often led by governors, and later by the 2002 reau-
thorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, known as No Child Left Behind (NCLB). Today, all 
states have achievement test score data in multiple sub-
jects in grades 3 through 8 and 1 grade in high school. 
Data on grade retention and high school graduation are 
vastly  improved.  In  some  states,  administrators  and 
researchers can follow the achievement progress of indi-
vidual students, allowing study of education growth from 
grade to grade. As required by NCLB, data are also made 
available to the public on the achievement performance 
of individual schools and districts. For schools that fail to 
meet performance standards, sanctions can be imposed. 
These changes amount to a revolution in terms of data, 
data availability, and a shift from a focus on education 
inputs to student outcomes. They also provide the poten-
tial for institutional and teacher accountability.
Salary Systems, Paying for Performance, 
and Other Reward Efforts in Education
Methods of paying teachers have evolved over time. In 
the 19th century, education was generally limited to chil-
dren of affluent families and took place in students’ homes. 
Teachers were paid in room and board and often migrated 
from home to home (2). As schools became widespread in 
the mid-19th century, salaries were often arbitrarily based 
on  sex,  education,  and  the  grade  of  the  classroom.  The 
inequities of differentiated salary scales between men and 
women were the target of emerging teachers’ unions and 
women’s equality movements. The result was the single- 
salary schedule first adopted in 1921. This schedule applied 
to all teachers and was based solely on years of experience 
and the teacher’s education. The idea caught on quickly 
and, by 1950, 97% of school districts had adopted the single-
salary schedule (2). Although it persists as the foundation 
of teacher compensation in public schools today, attempts 
to  build  incentives  for  performance  have  been  proposed 
repeatedly in the last 3 decades. An underlying difficulty is 
that people disagree over what defines performance.
Merit pay
The idea of merit pay has gained considerable atten-
tion during the past 25 years, although little systematic 
research shows the effects of merit pay on student achieve-
ment.  Existing  research  suggests  somewhat  negative 
effects;  however,  these  studies  have  several  problems. 
First,  “merit  pay”  encompasses  a  range  of  approaches 
to  teacher  evaluation  and  reward,  but  most  merit  pay 
rewards come either as one-time bonuses or as advances 
on  the  salary  scale  (3).  Second,  unmeasured  selection 
problems  may  exist,  both  in  terms  of  teachers,  where 
missing variables may be the real driver of results, and for 
students, who may be nonrandomly assigned to teachers. 
Third, the best estimate of the number of public districts 
at any given time that are participating in some form of 
merit pay is 10% to 15% (3,4). Finally, merit pay plans do 
not last long in school districts. Of the plans in existence 
in 1983, 75% were gone by 1993 (5). In a study by Ballou, 
only approximately 25% of merit pay plans survived dur-
ing a 6-year period (3).
Two reasons explain why merit pay plans in education 
do not persist. First, the characteristics of teaching make 
assessment of and support for incentive pay plans difficult, 
if not impossible. The art of teaching is hard to translate 
into objective measures and is a joint product of many peo-
ple, and the links between teaching and student achieve-
ment are elusive (6). Second, teachers’ unions oppose merit 
pay (4). One study compared pay-for-performance systems 
in  public  and  private  schools  by  using  data  from  the 
national Schools and Staffing Surveys for a 6-year period 
(3). The percentages of schools and districts with merit pay 
plans were approximately the same in public and private 
sectors.  However,  that  was  driven  by  Catholic  schools, 
which represented more than half of private schools. For 
the most recent year of the data (1993), the percentages 
of districts or schools with some form of merit pay plan 
were  public,  12%;  Catholic,  10%;  other  religious,  21%; 
and nonsectarian private, 35% (3). Catholic schools may 
have been under resource constraints, but other private 
schools demonstrated that merit pay plans could exist in 
high numbers. Public schools with collective bargaining 
agreements  (64%  of  schools  surveyed)  had  considerably 
fewer merit pay plans and lower plan survival rates than 
did schools with a “meet and confer system” (7% of schools) 
or that had no unions (29% of schools). The proportion of 
salary attributed to merit pay was 0% for schools under 
collective bargaining but 4% for schools with no union (3). 
Thus, the union environment affected the creation, longev-
ity, and effect of merit pay plans.
The reasons for union opposition have, in part, to do with 
disagreement over what constitutes high performance and 
how it should be measured. The Obama Administration, VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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in “Race to the Top” funding competitions, stresses the 
need to use student achievement test data as part of merit 
pay systems. Because unions often resist these methods, 
surely  as  the  exclusive  definition  of  meritorious  perfor-
mance, many unions refused to sign off on state proposals, 
and some states refused to apply at all.
Career ladders and national board certification
Another approach to incentives in education has been to 
try to define certification categories. Since teachers tradi-
tionally are either probationary or not, the only route to 
advancement is to leave teaching and become an adminis-
trator. To alleviate this problem and to reward successful 
teachers, states and districts have created various career 
ladder opportunities. Career ladder systems differ in terms 
of how the ladders are set up, how teachers advance, and 
what rewards they receive. Beginning in 1987, a national 
board certification process was established for individual 
teachers.
As with merit pay, only recently have rigorous, empiric 
studies assessed the effects of these programs on student 
achievement. One of the best studies was of the Tennessee 
Career Ladder Evaluation System, which began in 1985 
(7). The system was rigorous in terms of evaluative criteria 
and standards. The design of the program included conse-
quential rewards; moving from probationary status to the 
third (top) rung of the ladder could add up to $10,000 to a 
teacher’s base salary. Teachers moved up after extensive 
evaluations by principals and state officials.
However, as with merit pay studies, investigators found 
mixed  results  on  achievement.  One  study  found  that 
having  a  teacher  on  a  higher  rung  of  the  career  lad-
der increased achievement in math but not reading (7). 
However, that result was confined to teachers only at the 
first of 3 possible rungs of the ladder. Equally problematic 
was a program audit that found that 95% of those who 
attempted  that  rung  were  given  the  certificate;  69%  of 
teachers were on the first rung, and only 7% in were on 
rungs 2 or 3. After 2 years, the program was made vol-
untary, and it was terminated by the state legislature in 
1997 because of a lack of funds.
The  only  national-level  career  development  system 
is a certification process begun in 1987 by the National 
Board of Professional Teacher Standards (NBPTS). That 
process, which is voluntary for teachers, allows national 
certification  after  a  screening  and  assessment  process 
that includes construction of teaching portfolios (includ-
ing  video  recordings  of  instruction);  evidence  provided 
by students, parents, and colleagues; and assessments of 
teaching practices, methods, and pedagogy. The process 
usually takes several years. Many states provide appli-
cation grants and monetary rewards for completing the 
certification process.
Three major studies have assessed the effects of NBPTS 
certification on student achievement and teacher effective-
ness. Two studies in North Carolina found varying degrees 
of positive effects for teachers who achieved national board 
certification  (8-11).  The  studies  found  significant  differ-
ences  in  student  achievement  for  future  board-certified 
teachers before their application to the NBPTS program, 
termed a “signaling effect.” The results showed that these 
advantages persisted after certification, but the advantages 
over noncertified teachers were small and, in some cases, 
not significant. The results may have been due to selection 
effects: better teachers may have sought certification.
The most recent large sample study evaluated elemen-
tary and high school teachers in Florida by using a gain 
score  analysis  similar  to  that  used  in  North  Carolina. 
However,  unlike  the  North  Carolina  studies,  investiga-
tors found neither a prior (signaling) effect nor significant 
differences after certification (12). The authors concluded, 
“Based on our findings for Florida, the efficacy of NBPTS 
as a tool to improve student learning appears question-
able.  The  2  main  potential  benefits  are  to  identify  and 
reward productive teachers and to encourage teachers to 
improve  their  teaching  skills.  Our  results  suggest  that 
NBPTS does neither, at least when teacher productivity 
is measured in terms of student achievement gains soon 
after a teacher becomes certified” (12).
Explicit schemes to create a pay-for-performance system, 
including merit pay or teacher ranking systems, have not 
been successful in implementation or in having consistent 
effects  on  student  achievement.  These  results  have  led 
scholars and some educators to recommend a more direct 
approach, by paying teachers for how much their students 
learn over time.
Growth and value-added models
State  standardized  tests,  especially  given  the  yearly 
testing requirements of NCLB, supply the necessary data VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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to track student progress longitudinally. NCLB requires 
only reporting and accountability at the school or district 
level with cohort scores, but many states have noted that 
a fairer system would hold schools accountable for growth 
that individual students make from year to year. Although 
the language in this area is not always clear, I refer to 
change metrics as “growth scores” when they are recorded 
with an estimated yearly change as the basic measure; 
“value-added” describes a sequence of changes and pro-
jected  growth  patterns  that  are  created  for  individual 
students.
Growth  and  value-added  models  address  problems  of 
selection bias for teachers. Because students may not be 
randomly assigned to teachers, under most state report-
ing systems, a teacher who attracts or is assigned lower-
achieving students will be penalized if judged solely on 
a yearly cohort score. That lower achievement is related 
to student and family characteristics and perhaps prior 
education. Growth scores assume that the historical accu-
mulation of these family and educational resources is cap-
tured by including the previous test in estimation models.
Controlling for prior level of achievement may not be suf-
ficient, however, because achievement depends not only on 
a starting place but also a rate of growth. For example, a 
student who begins school at a lower level of achievement 
may have a steeper learning curve than a student with 
higher prior achievement. In this case, the yearly growth 
will be an invalid indicator of what was accomplished in 
that year. However, if a sequence of annual scores is avail-
able for each student, an average rate of progress can be 
determined, and we can estimate future projected achieve-
ment. This projection or trajectory can then be used as an 
expectation of the value added by a school or teacher over 
time. In this model, both the starting differences and the 
growth rates of students are taken into consideration, and 
either schools or teachers could be judged on how well stu-
dents do on the basis of their projected outcomes.
Theoretically,  future  deviations  from  the  trajectory 
(residuals in a statistical model) could be linked backward 
to prior teachers. This procedure would construct a value-
added model for rewarding teachers. Such a model was 
first  suggested  and  implemented  in  Tennessee  (13);  in 
recent years, a variant has been suggested as a tool for use 
in the teacher tenure process (14).
Implementing such a reward system at the teacher level 
would be associated with many problems, and integrating 
it  into  a  school-level  accountability  system,  as  required 
by NCLB, would be even more problematic. Using value-
added models to evaluate programs, which means system 
accountability, should be distinguished from using them to 
judge individual teachers. Measurement and other errors 
in tests are particularly problematic when the sample of 
students is small, as in the case of an individual teacher 
(15). This limitation explains a troublesome finding that 
teacher rankings that use value-added models are highly 
inconsistent  from  year  to  year  (C.  Koedel,  unpublished 
data). If value added is an accurate estimate of teacher 
quality and effectiveness, one would expect stability over 
time. Measurement problems are explored in detail else-
where (16).
Value-added methods are still the hottest topic in paying 
for performance in education. The approach has been used, 
the student-linked data records are or will be available in 
most states, and the method will probably be an option for 
states if NCLB is reauthorized in the future.
Summary of Accountability and 
Performance Efforts in Education
In the past 25 years, the resources and data available 
to  provide  system-level  accountability  (either  school  or 
district)  have  improved,  generating  a  stronger  focus  on 
student outcomes as the appropriate measure of account-
ability,  reward,  and  sanctions.  According  to  state  and 
federal mandates, districts and schools are under pressure 
to increase achievement. Schools and districts are being 
found “in need of improvement” under NCLB — a status 
made available to the public. They are also facing increas-
ing sanctions for successive years of failure.
Several conclusions can be made concerning this move-
ment to system accountability. First, the “report card” era, 
applied to states, districts, and even schools, that began in 
the Reagan administration, has subsided. Second, NCLB, 
its  system  replacement,  has  been  met  with  widespread 
unhappiness, and if the current administration’s legisla-
tive proposals are adopted, may be essentially dismantled, 
eliminating  in  particular  any  punitive  actions  against 
schools.
System-level accountability has yet to be translated into 
successful teacher accountability, despite many efforts to VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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install  merit  pay,  career  ladders,  certification  systems, 
and most recently, directly rewarding teachers for student 
success. Translating system-level accountability into indi-
vidual accountability may be even more difficult for health 
care because of the more complex nature of the organiza-
tions and services in that field.
From Education to Health Care
Education and health care share several characteristics 
when it comes to accountability and performance. Both 
can be examined in terms of system-level or individual 
accountability.  As  in  education,  system-level  account-
ability in health care has improved in terms of measuring 
performance through organizational report cards, audits, 
and ratings of hospitals, nursing homes, and other facili-
ties (17).
Both  systems  also  share  a  hierarchy  that  directly 
affects and limits the implementation of individual-level 
performance incentives. Both hierarchies are flat in the 
sense  that  movement  upward  is  generally  unrelated  to 
performance and depends primarily on credentialing and 
time  on  the  job.  Unlike  most  other  public  and  private 
organizations, in education and health care, simply doing 
a job well will rarely allow a person to be promoted to a 
higher-level job. This problem cuts off the central means 
of reward that exists in government, the military, and the 
corporate world: promotion as a reward for doing a job 
well. The efforts in education with merit pay and career 
ladders can be interpreted as artificially instilling organi-
zational advancement; unfortunately, as with most things 
artificial, these efforts have routinely failed.
Flat hierarchies shift the burden of reward and sanc-
tion to paying people for performance on the job. Although 
standard personnel practices, such as annual reviews by 
supervisors  and  peers,  may  be  the  most  likely  road  to 
determining  performance,  union  environments  in  both 
fields may make this difficult. Attempts to create perfor-
mance metrics that may be more objective than supervisor 
judgment have been the result. In education, that led to 
exploring value-added assessments based on longitudinal 
student achievement.
The final issue is whether performance-based systems 
will be easier or more difficult in health care. Individual-
level performance metrics will be as difficult to create and 
implement in health care as they were in education, if not 
more so. Health care hierarchies are more complex, they 
deal with a broader range of clients, they provide more 
diverse services, and they require more teamwork. In edu-
cation, after all is said about joint production, school mis-
sions, and multiple stakeholders, for most of the day a sin-
gle teacher is behind a closed door with students who are 
trying to accomplish more or less the same tasks. Although 
we argue that we need to judge education outcomes on 
more than performance on standardized tests, those tests 
certainly help, and the list of other performance measures 
mentioned is usually small.
Compare this with a routine procedure in health care, 
vivid in my recent memory — the colonoscopy. For a 2-
hour procedure, no fewer than 11 people were involved, 
each performing a different function that would be evalu-
ated on different criteria using (presumably) different met-
rics. To be sure, some areas of health care require fewer 
people and simpler tasks (such as laboratory diagnoses, 
routine physical examinations, immunizations), but many 
other areas are even more complex than a colonoscopy.
Finally, if my analysis of education is correct, with the 
lack of consistent success of individual-level performance 
accountability  methods,  the  outlook  for  following  those 
approaches in health care is even bleaker. What then to 
do?  First,  system-level  performance  and  accountability 
procedures are not trivial accomplishments. This implies 
the need for top-down approaches of oversight and respon-
sibility, furthering those installed in education and health 
care during the last decades. Second, the only reasonable 
approach to individual performance metrics, other than 
falling  back  on  credentialing  and  experience  as  reward 
markers, is from the bottom up, on a unit level, with a 
supervisor evaluating individual employees. The complex-
ity of the tasks, services, and patient mix in health care 
suggests that any overarching system would be doomed to 
failure. The bottom-up, unit-by-unit approach is probably 
being used in most instances already. Incremental tinker-
ing and experimenting with objective measures tailored to 
units and jobs, with oversight by responsible supervisors, 
might not be a radical enough solution for many, but it still 
might be the right approach.
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